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ABSTRACT
The enterprise architecture (EA) plan is a long-term

view or blueprint for an organization. It is a very

important blueprint for balancing business and IT
technology and for adding value to an organization.

Security is also an essential dimension for enterprises

nowadays. It can prevent confidential information from
leaking, being stolen and lost, or suffering from other
serious disasters. There are many researches focusing on EA

and specific aspects of security. However, there are very
few researchers concentrating on enterprise security
architecture that is based on the Zachman EA framework
(Zachman, 2007) . This paper will incorporate the security
dimension with the Zachman EA framework, which intends to

serve as an enterprise security framework assist an
organization to successfully and effectively implement
security.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

An enterprise architecture plan (EAP), provides a.
long-term view or blueprints for organizations. An EAP

generally includes five essential categories: governance,
business architecture, applications architecture, data

architecture, and technology architecture (Carbone, 2004;
Ross, 2003; Spewak, 1993; Zachman, 1987). The enterprise

architecture starts with the forming of governance groups,
such as an EA management team and an architecture team (Boh

& Yellin, 2 006) . These two teams are in charge of
developing the EAP, including setting the scope and goals.
The architecture team starts by analyzing the business

framework, such as where the organization is today, what
the target will be, and what the critical success factors

(CSF) are that would help to achieve set the goals and
targets. After analysis, the business architecture is first

built and then followed by the development of the data

architecture, the application architecture and the
technology architecture. Three essential principles of

applying EA can benefit organizations the most. The first

foundation EA principle is to align business and technology.
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Tallon (2007) demonstrates the strong positive relationship

between strategic alignment and firm performance,

especially from process-level perspectives. He also

demonstrates that proper alignment can enhance business
value as well. The second principle is to link business

needs to the IT infrastructure. This principle can ensure

that IT infrastructure provides all services that a
business needs. The third principle is to adopt top-down

governance, which ensures the alignment of IT
infrastructure with business goals and objectives.

Security architecture is a concept that aims to design
the infrastructure of information systems to ensure that

they provide enough security to organizations and
businesses (Sherwood, 2005) . Traditionally, organizations

address two categories of threats against the security of
organizations and their businesses: distributed attacks and

insider threats (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006) . Networking
technology connects all computers together no matter where
computers are located in the world. This technology creates
convenience when conducting research, when connecting with
people across the globe, when the need arises to gather

needed information efficiently, and so forth. Nevertheless,
it also provides great opportunities for attackers to

2

remotely access computers within enterprises locally. These
types of threat are called a distributed attack. The second

type of threat comes from insiders, such as employees.
These insiders are authorized to access organizations'

information systems. However, due to the lack of
unawareness of the correct usage of information technology
or other reasons, sometimes they involve the exploitation

of non-technical vulnerabilities.
Today, most businesses rely on information technology

much more heavily than in the past. Carelessly designed
security architecture would have a serious impact on a
business, such as the high risk of being unable to do daily

business operations. This heavy reliance on information
systems highlights the importance of developing efficient
and effective security architecture within the entire

enterprise.

Unfortunately, emphasizing security technology alone
is not enough to produce effective and efficient security
for the entire organization (Sherwood, 2005) . Security

technology itself is designed to resolve security issues
without considering other factors, such as cost and
business operating models. Businesses differ in terms of
organizational scopes, sizes, capital capacities, business
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operating models, and top management support (Boh & Yellin,
2006). These factors affect the security needs and the
security trust level (Sherwood, 2005). Based on the Zachman

framework to develop enterprise security architecture,

developers can clearly understand the security needs of

business and the priority of implementing security projects
in a specific time period and in a specific manner. With a

plan based on this framework, developers have a very clear
view of the entire procedure and are able to fully control
the situation, such as the status of implementing these

security needs, and the impact, and the ability to

effectively respond to unexpected events and so on.

Furthermore, the enterprise security architecture based on
the Zachman framework can allow developers to plan and

examine new advanced information technology and systems
with appropriate security solutions at once. This not only
can provide new business opportunities by increasing the

convenience and speed of business processes (Fumy &
Sauerbrey, 2006), but also can guarantee the

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of business
information (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006). From the

organizational perspective, it saves money. All of these
advantages depict that the enterprise security architecture
4

based on the Zachman framework can produce effective and
efficient security for an entire organization.
This research develops a framework that incorporates
the security dimension within the Zachman EA framework,

assist in successful implementation of the necessary
security for organizations . In addition, it' s also been

applied to an organization for its efficacy. The result of
this research provides a guideline for an organization to

create an enterprise architecture plan efficiently, and to
easily using this plan for transferring business security
needs into IT and security infrastructure (implementation).

There are seven chapters in the paper. Chapter one is
intended to provide the introduction of the paper. Chapter
two is designed to discuss the literature review for the

Zachman EA and security architecture. Chapter three is to
describe the purpose of writing this paper. Chapter four

consists of a framework development, which starts from
providing an effective governance approach. An effective

governance approach has three fundamental components:
independent EA teams with top managers involved, formal
monitoring process, and top-down governance approach. The

second section is designed to define the scope and goals,

which affect the time and cost of development and
5

implementing. The section business framework provides

guidelines of gathering information efficiently and also
presents alternative approaches for analyzing the current
state and the target state, performing gap analysis, and

identifying critical success factors. Aligning business
security needs and security technology, and how to
establish business architecture by using appropriate tools,
such as Provision and Rational Rose, are also presented in

the third section. The fourth section 'framework for

securing data, application, and technology' is addressed by
providing security services, guidelines, strategies,
principles, or architecture for three fundamental
categories of IT infrastructure. The next section 'security
framework' is intended to develop the entire lifecycle of

security policy, which will also be used in the last
section of this chapter for illustrating the role of
security framework in the Zachman EA framework. In Chapter

six, an organization is used as an example to illustrate
the efficacy of the developed enterprise security framework.

The analysis, results and implication of the organization
will be written in Chapter five and six. The final chapter

represents conclusions derived from this project.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are very few research projects with a focus on

enterprise security that is based on the Zachman
architecture. Much of the academic research has been

focused either on pure Zachman architecture or on security

algorithms, database technology, application, and
networking to improve efficiency and effectiveness

(Cavusoglu, 2005; Danielyan, 2001; McGee, et al., 2004).
Even though there are some books focusing on an entire

company's security, most of these primarily focus on
various up-to-date technologies for securing organizations
(Buecker et al., 2004). Unfortunately, implementing
security projects alone without considering business needs,
aligning business and security technology, and applying

appropriate, effective, and efficient governance mechanism
can result in spending too much time and money for

inefficient implementation of security technology that may
not be very suitable for organizations.

This paper will develop a procedural-level framework

that incorporates the security dimension with the Zachman
EA framework. This approach can avoid delay in delivery
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benefit of implementing projects and spending too much
money on projects. Due to different business models, sizes,
and financial conditions, organizations need to choose

appropriate technology at appropriate security level for
implementation, based on business needs and status. While

alignment between business and security technology can

allow managers to develop a comprehensive enterprise plans,
and translate alignment into enhanced IT security, there

are residual effects on business performance for producing

IT security business value (Kearns & Sabherwal, 2006;
Tallon, 2007). The appropriate governance approach can
ensure alignment is translated into IT security effects in
a cost-effective and time-efficient manner.
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CHAPTER THREE
PURPOSE OF STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to develop an

enterprise security framework that is based on a
comprehensive following of the Zachman EA architecture. A

top-down approach is used to arrange this paper, starting

with an analysis of the security needs of the business
framework for an organization. Then, the security

architectures for data, application, and technology
dimensions will be developed. Following the framework to
develop an enterprise plan can eventually increase

employees' security awareness. The reason is that at the
implementation phase, the general written materials of the
enterprise plan will be distributed to relative employees,
and employees can learn security from well developed

documentation. Furthermore, following the framework to
develop an enterprise plan can identify and manage security

concerns easily within an entire enterprise, facilitate the
process of resolving security issues within an organization,

adapt change, modify partial security architecture with
ease, and to easily increase quality of the entire

organizational security. The reason being is that at the
9

development phase, business security needs are considered
within an enterprise plan. Consideration for these business
security needs is also consistent within the entire

enterprise.

10

CHAPTER FOUR

FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT

Based on the Zachman EA framework, strategic alignment
and governance is an integral part of security in

developing the enterprise security framework, and all
security needs for data, application, and technology

dimensions need to derive from business (Fumy & Sauerbrey,

2006; Sherwood, 2005; Zachman, 1987).
Proper alignment business security needs and security

technology supports organizations to gain competitive

advantages, and assists organizations to generate a higher
return from its technical investment as compared to those
which have a misalignment of business and technology (Ross,
2003). Developing enterprise plans with well planned

strategic alignment can guarantee a certain degree of
quality, and can consequently reduce implementation error

or unexpected events from happening, as well as increase
the likelihood of successfully implementing projects

without delay to gain benefit from project investments
(Kearns & Sabherwal, 2006).

From governance perspectives, the top-down and
centralization of decisions is the most effective
11

governance approach to manage architectures for value
(Kearns & Sabherwal, 2006; Ross, 2003). Efficient and
effective governance can ensure that organizations are

compliant with comprehensive enterprise plans, and
eventually perceive IT security business value.
Consequently, this research adopts a top-down approach,

starting from presenting an effective governance approach,
followed by identifying scope and goals, analyzing security

needs for business framework, and developing the security
architectures for data, application, and technology

dimensions.
The term "developing teams" is used throughout this

paper. Depending on where to mention the term in paper, the

term "developing teams" can mean differently. It can be the

architecture team, data architecture sub-team, application
architecture sub-team, technology architecture sub-team,
security policy teams, incident response team, risk

management and analysis teams, or implementing teams for

different phases.
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Framework of Governance
The practice of governance can help organizations

apply IT technology and security efficiently and

effectively (IT Governance Institute and the Office of
Government Commerce, 2005). Governance is like the top roof

of the building, which guides, controls and monitors all
dimensions mentioned above in this paper. Governance

addresses essential parts of IT and security activities:
strategic alignment, value delivery, risk management,

resource management, and performance measurement. Hence, an
effective governance framework and practice of governance
can align business and technology, making sure that

organizations spend money and time on advancing technology
which is what businesses need. An effective framework and

great practice of governance also can optimize cost and
guarantee to provide the value of IT to organizations.
Resource management that governance focuses on, can make

sure IT and security projects apply optimizing
infrastructure of IT and security. Another benefit that the

effective framework and practice of governance can provide

to organizations is to control and trace the status of
project delivery, to measure performance, and to monitor IT
activities and services.
13

An Effective Governance Approach
An effective governance approach should consider
structure of governance, monitoring process of governance,
and the direction of governance.

Structure of Governance. Forming integrating

managerial and architectural teams and clearly defining

their roles, authority and responsibility is the most
effective governance approach (Boh & Yellin, 2006) . This

approach can facilitate EA development and implementation

by dividing the whole EA project into different sub
projects and sub-tasks, which are assigned to different
team members. This approach formally gives team members

accountability for coordinating across units, because the
main goal of these teams is to govern the setting and use
of EA. Major responsibilities of each role are elaborated

below.
Roles and Responsibilities. There are different

roles within teams. Different roles have different levels
of authority and responsibility. With clearly defined roles,

authority and responsibility are properly defined in terms

of who handles which tasks. This process can help to easily

pinpoint which EA sub-proj ects and sub-tasks have

accomplished and by whom. Boh and Yellin (2006) define four
14

main roles: EA management team, chief architect,
architecture team, and key EA stakeholders.

EA Management Team. An effective governance
approach is to get the board and top managers from business

units and XT departments involved in the EA management team

(National Computing Centre, 2006). The main
responsibilities of the integrating managerial team are to
set direction, to guide management by aligning business

needs and technology, and to make sure IT issues are
uncovered.

Architecture Team and Chief Architect. An
architecture team is formed not only for developing EA but
also for governing EA. An architecture team can be divided

into different sub-teams, based on functions needed.
Generally, the entire architecture team has at least 3 sub

teams: a data architecture sub-team, an application

architecture sub-team, and a technology architecture sub
team. The chief architect is the leader of all sub-team,
and is responsible for guiding the entire architecture team

to govern EA.

EA Stakeholders. According to the definition from
Boh and Yellin (2006), EA stakeholders can be IT personnel
who implement projects. They also can be the end users who

15

are working within the business units. Both IT personnel

and end users know their daily operating procedures and the

needed data to operate efficiently.

Monitoring Process of Governance. In addition to the

structure of governance, the monitoring processes of
governance should also be formalized. The monitoring

processes of governance are defined as the processes of

monitoring whether organizations' operations conform to the
settings of EA. Appropriate monitoring processes of
governance also can facilitate architecture teams in the

implementation EA within the organization. Boh and Yellin
(2006) mention that two aspects can be considered for

monitoring processes: developing EA based on industrial

standards, and conforming to EA.
Developing EA Based on Industrial Standards. Some
of the most well-known industrial standards of security are
ISO, CoBit, and ITIL (IT Governance and the Political
Dimension, 2007). Developing EA, based on these industrial

standards, can have a many advantages. Adopting industrial
standards into EA can assure that organizations can find

compatible technology easily, and that skilled technical
employees can be found without any problems. Another

advantage is that organizations can gain benefit directly
16

from these well-known industrial standards without taking

much risk in terms of failing projects. The reason is that
these industrial standards have been developed deliberately,
and have been examined by many companies in various
industries.

Conforming to an EA Plan. Conforming to an EA

plan can ensure that organizations obtain maximum benefit
from adopting EA. A well developed EA plan consists of
balancing business security needs and security technical

investment, and appropriately transferring business

security needs to data architecture, application

architecture, and technology architecture in a costeffective manner. In other words, conforming to a well
developed EA plan can ensure that all business needs have

been considered for implementation into data architecture,

application architecture, and technical architecture.
Furthermore, conforming to a well developed EA plan can

also create a better quality of implementation with fewer

errors (Kearns & Sabherwal, 2006). Without conforming to an
EA plan, the EA plan is just a documentation of a blueprint,
and organizations not only waste time and money to develop

the EA plan, but also a delay in the gain of benefits from

implementing any projects at all.

17

The Direction of Governance. Top-down governance is
the most effective direction for governance (Boh & Yellin,

2006; IT Governance Institute and the Office of Government
Commerce, 2005). There are two reasons that this is the

most effective direction with the first being that the topdown approach makes communication easy between the

architecture team and IT employees. Technical employees can

just simply follow the blueprint to develop and implement
specific projects. They also can provide their thoughts and
concerns to the architecture team. Secondly, a top-down

governance approach can make controls standardized (Kearns
& Sabherwal, 2006), which can easily manage, control, and
monitor the status of technical diversity in organizations.

In other words, the top-down governance approach can

effectively reengineer infrastructures, implement new
technology, control schedules of implementations and

integrations, and monitor all types of project activities

(IT Governance Institute and the Office of Government
Commerce, 2 005) .

Scope and Goals

Clearly defining scope is very important. Clear scope
can give team members ideas about the size of projects,
18

overall estimated time for development and implementation,
and which areas the projects will affect.
Knowledge of organizational goals is one fundamental

step to integrate business security needs and opportunities
in future technical projects (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2 00 6) .

Based on organization's goals, developing teams can help to

develop comprehensive enterprise plans by identifying a

target state, analyzing the businesses current environment,
identifying potential risks and opportunities, aligning

business and IT security, and eventually translating into
IT security infrastructure. This approach can help to

ensure that security projects be implemented meet business

needs.

Business Framework

When establishing an appropriate and clear enterprise

security architecture plan that can be easily implemented,
incorporating Zachman's enterprise architecture with

enterprise security architecture is believed to be a good

practice. The main reason is that the Zachman framework
starts from business needs, and then transforms business

needs to technical proj ects, including IT and security
projects (Zachman, 1987). Applying the Zachman framework
19

can help to ensure that all technical projects are actually-

needed by the business and are implemented in a cost
effective manner.
The fundamental step of the Zachman framework is to

analyze organizations and their businesses (See Figure 1),
which in turn can develop business attribute profiles.
Continuously analyzing these collected business attribute
profiles helps to identify what organizations' goals are,
what an organizations' operating models are, and what the

critical success factors are.

Figure 1. Business and Contextual Security Architecture
Derived from (Carbone, 2004; Sherwood, 2005)

Building a business framework can help developing
teams efficiently identify all needed information for
establishing an appropriate and clear enterprise security
architecture plan (Carbone, 2004), which can be effectively

implemented. The business framework is composed of the
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current state, the target state, and the gap between the
two (See Figure 2). Developing teams can analyze gap and

know what the CSF are for effectively achieving the target

state, which are the organizations' opportunities. Knowing
all of the above information helps to ensure that business

security needs have been considered for further IT and
security projects.

Contextual

Conceptual

Figure 2. Business Framework
Derived from (Carbone, 2004; Sherwood, 2005)

Gathering Sufficient Information and Documentation

To analyze the current state and construct the target

state, developing teams need to collect sufficient
information about organizations. Developing teams can start
to collect key facts about organizations. See Appendix B
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for getting of some essential information that needs to be
collected, and some essential collection resources and

approaches, which can help developing teams more efficient
in capturing the current state and bottom-line security
concerns of organizations (Carbone, 2004).

Current Security State

Knowing the current security state can help developing
teams establish appropriate enterprise architecture and

plan further security projects in cost effective manner.
Each organization has different security states. Generally
speaking, security states of organizations can be

classified into two categories: green-field type and
experienced type (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006). Green-field type
indicates that organizations have very limited security, or
may have a less than acceptable level of security for their

business and organizations (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2 0 06) .

Experienced type indicates that organizations have a well

developed security infrastructure in organizations for
years to come. These organizations have concrete ideas
about information security management, such as security

policy, risk management, and business continuity management

(Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006). Usually, it takes a few years of
development to go from the green-field type to the
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experienced type (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006). In other words,

different types and states of security will result in

developing different enterprise security architectures.
Therefore, knowing what types and states of security that

organizations currently have is a fundamental and

significant step in building appropriate enterprise
security architecture, and also helps developing teams to

further plan suitable security projects. Collectinginformation and documentation about organizations and
business can help developing teams identify which types and
states of security that organizations currently have, which
can also be called the current security state in business

framework.
Analyzing the Current Security State
Developing teams can use an assessment indicators

approach to analyze the current state. This approach can

enable developing teams to efficiently summarize the
essential current status about organizations. Some basic

assessment indicators include stress points, risks,
strengths and weaknesses,

challenges,

environmental factors,

and growth/cost containment opportunities (Carbone, 2004).
Developing teams can simply list all answers for these
assessment indicators first, and then document it.
23

Constructing the Target Security State

The target state is the state that organizations try
to achieve. It embodies the achievement of a mission and
goals. Developing teams can start to construct the target
state simply by reversing results of each indicator this is

defective in the current state. At the target state, all

issues mentioned at the current state should be resolved.
Developing teams can discuss all answers of each indicator

first, and then document it. This process of conversion is
a very important step. This step can allow developing teams

to obtain a much more clear idea of what the target should
be for organizations. Defining targets for further security
plans can narrow down the scope of finding sufficient

information for establishing a clear plan and easily
identifying critical risks (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006) .
Identifying Gaps, Opportunities (Critical Success
Factors), and Potential Projects

Knowing the CSF is extremely important because it

transfers business security needs to IT and security

projects. Developing teams can start with comparing each
statement of the current state with each statement of the

target state, and extracting a set of target business
opportunities that can direct and drive the IT and security
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architecture effort (Carbone, 2004). Developing teams need

to identify actions of these opportunities, which will

become potential or candidate projects later (See Figure3),
and document them.

Analysis
(C.S.F.)

Potential Prog ects

Flow Chart of Identifying Potential Projects
Derived from (Carbone, 2004)

At this identification phase, the last thing that

developing teams should do is jump to conclusions and state

that, "xxx project is what we are going to do". There are
two reasons for this. First, if a developing team skips the

analysis of identifying gaps and opportunities, not all

developing team members will really understand what an
organization really needs or the impact of the changed

direction. When developing team members are not clear about
what can make organizations more competitive, it is not
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easy to develop the suitable business architecture (See
Figure 4 step 1). An incomplete or inappropriate business
model would result in badly designed data architecture,

application architecture and technology architecture for
organizations (See Figure 4 step 2). Eventually, it would
result in failure of implementation (See Figure 4 step 3).
Second, analyzing the target state sometimes can bring

about different solutions than what was expected at the

beginning. Everybody has "blind spots", which causes

developing teams to miss some essential points at the
beginning. By efficiently analyzing both the current state

and target state with appropriate tools, critical issues or
potential issues can be easily pinpointed.

Step 1

Business
Modeling

.4_____

Data
Modeling

_______ 4______

Applications
Modeling

______ 4.

Technology
Modeling

1r
1 T
1r
Implementation or Migration Plans

Step 2

Step 3

Figure 4. Steps of Modeling and Implementation
Adopted from (Spewak, 1993)
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Critical Success Factors - Security. The effective use
of policy and security technology is critical to the

success of organizations. Critical success factors are
factors that enable organizations to obtain a competitive
advantage, increase productivity and profile, and ensure a
great reputation that comes from providing secure service
to customers. Critical potential risks that hurt businesses
or cause severe damage for organizations are also CSF. For

example, no backup plan for the core database that

businesses use every second of the day is a critical risk.
Organizations could lose a lot of money when something goes

wrong with the core database. Hence, securing the core

database is one of the CSF for organizations. The
identification of CSF will gain as much benefit as possible

from IT and security investment.

Risk assessment and analysis can become a -tool to
analyze gap, which is between the current security state
and target security state, and to identify CSF for

organizations at this phase. One main purpose of risk

assessment and analysis is to identify risks and to
prioritize them. These critical risks are critical success

factors because reducing or removing these critical risks
can protect business drivers from keeping or gaining
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competitive advantages in organizations. Therefore, risk
assessment and analysis can play an essential role in
analyzing gaps and in identifying CSF.
Risk Management and Analysis. Risk management is also
an essential pre-requisite to make organizations secure.
Security policies and risk management play different roles

to keep organizations secure. Security policies are "the
bottom line-the boundaries of security acceptability"

(The

Information Security Policies & Standards Group, 2007)
while risk management plays the role as a supplement to

security policies. From a security perspective, some areas

may be more sensitive than others within organizations.
Applying risk management in organizations can supplement

security policies for these sensitive areas that need more
stringent security measures.
The Importance of Risk Management and Analysis.
Organizations would suffer serious loss if they do not pay

enough attention to potential risks resulting from external

factors (e.g. attacks), or from failed or inadequate
internal processes, people, and systems. Risk assessment
can reduce the probability of loss and damage, caused from

threats. Risk concept has five basic elements: assets,

threats, impact, vulnerabilities, and likelihood (Sherwood,
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2005). Assessing risk involves identifying assets that
organizations have to protect for running daily businesses,

identifying threats that may cause damages, evaluating and

knowing impact of threats, identifying vulnerabilities that

become weakness parts for potential attacks, and

determining likelihood of vulnerabilities. Therefore, the
result of risk assessment is one of the essential drivers
for enterprise security. Developing teams also can base

decisions on the result of assessing risk and business

needs to establish appropriate enterprise security sub
architectures for information,

applications, and technology.

Life Cycle of Risk Management and Analysis. The
life cycle of risk management and analysis is illustrated
in Figure 5. The first phase is to form risk management and
analysis teams. The second phase is to perform risk

assessment and analysis. There are many methods and various
steps for assessing and analyzing risks. This paper covers
only some of the common main steps. After the second phase,
teams should regularly track risk for preventing disasters
from happening suddenly.
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Figure 5. The Life Cycle of Risk Management and Analysis

Risk Management and Analysis Teams Formation. The

main purpose of risk management is to continually identify,
assess and analyze risk, prioritize risk, reduce risk
levels to acceptable levels, and implement appropriate

protection strategies or mechanisms for keeping
organizations secure (Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute, 2007). The main goal of risk management team is

to protect organizations in the most cost-effective manner

(Harris , 2005) .
A risk management team is composed of current full-

time senior employees, not new employees. Full-time

employees have been working for organizations for a while
so they understand the organizations status, including
weaknesses, threats, strengths, and so forth. It would be a
better practice to have managers in teams because strong

management support is a key factor for successfully
implementing projects. These ideal candidates include
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senior managers, chief information officer, system
information owners, department managers, IT security

program managers, IT security officers, administrators,

security specialists, computer specialists, or security

awareness trainers (Stoneburner, Goguenl, & Feringa, 2002) .

Leaders of a risk management team can be either IT security
program managers or IT security officers.
Risk analysis is like a tool for risk management
(Harris, 2005) . Risk analysis is used to identify risk and

loss that those risks may cause, and then to determine

which risks should be handled first and then to take
appropriate actions for protecting organizations against

them.
Having senior professionals or employees from
different departments in teams can help to easily point out

vulnerabilities in their professional areas. In other words,

it would be a great practice to have various backgrounds in
teams for ensuring that all threats can be pinpointed and

handled. These desired candidates can be security
specialists, IT administrators, systems administrators,

data administrators, IT employees who work directly with

applications, or representatives at different levels of all
management

(Threat and Risk Assessment Working Guide, 2007).
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Interviews can be conducted if some of them are not able to
be included in teams.
For efficiently assessing and analyzing risk, all team

members should have a clear idea about why the team is
formed, and what they are expected to contribute.

Risk Assessment and Analysis. For performing risk

assessment and analysis, there are many methods with
various steps. These methods fall into two categories:
quantitative and qualitative approaches. For conducting

quantitative risk assessment and analysis, teams need to
use actual numbers and industrial formulas to calculate

monetary loss of each threat for assessing, analyzing, and

prioritizing risks. For conducting qualitative risk
assessment and analysis, teams do not need to know neither

actual numbers nor industrial formulas. Teams simply need
to know scenarios of threats, and use simple scales to

determine the degree of business impact, vulnerabilities,
and likelihood for assessing, analyzing, and prioritizing

risks (Harris, 2005).
This paper covers only some of the common main steps
for performing risk assessment and analysis (Harris, 2005;

Sherwood, 2005; Shoniregun, 2005; Stonebumer, 2002), as

illustrated in Figure 6. The first step is to set the scope
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for assessing and analyzing risks. The second step is that

teams need to identify information and assets, and then

assign a value to each asset. The third step is to identify
threats, followed by analyzing business impact, assessing

vulnerabilities and likelihood. After gathering all needed
information, teams can start to assess, analyze, and

prioritize risks, which is step six. Step seven is to
select the most appropriate countermeasures and protection
mechanisms for organizations, based on the result of

assessing, analyzing, and prioritizing risks. These
countermeasures and protection mechanisms can fall into
four categories: rejecting, reducing, transferring, or

accepting risk. The last step is to plan and take action to

handle risk.

33

Set the Scope

Figure 6. Steps of Performing Quantitative Risk
Assessment and Analysis
Derived from (Harris, 2005; Sherwood, 2005;
Shoniregun, 2005; Stonebumer, 2002)

Step 1: Set the Scope. It is always a good
practice to set the scope for each project. Performing risk

assessment and analysis should enable a team to set the
scope. Setting the scope can allow all team members to have
an overall picture about what they should focus on and
where they will go.
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Step 2: Identify Organizational Assets, and

Assign value. It is important for teams to know what should
be protected and how much it would cost if appropriate

protections are not applied. Team members can base on the

scope of the project, organizational attributes, policies,
or external drivers, such as standard compliance and

regulations (Threat and Risk Assessment Working Guide,
2007), to identify all assets. In the quantitative

assessment and analysis approach, for precisely assessing
and analyzing risk, teams also can assign the total
estimated value to assets. The total estimated value of

assets not only includes the value of tangible assets, but
also includes the value of intangible assets, personnel,

and services (Beauchemin & Dansereau, 2007). Identifying
organizational assets and knowing their value can also give

a team a much clear idea about what the most important

assets are and which levels of protection are worthy and
should take place.

Step 3: Identify Threats. Based on different
types of threat agents, threats can be classified into

eight categories: virus, hacker, user, fire, employee,

contractor, attacker, and intruder (Harris, 2005). Teams
can focus on those identified assets to make a list of all
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threats, which are relative to the identified assets. In
addition, teams can try to identify threats by looking at

process, design, test results, potential shortfalls,
dependencies, and so forth (Department of Defense, 2006).

No matter which method a team uses for listing threats,

they should begin to identify threats as early as possible
and should regularly review them. The difference between

the quantitative approach and qualitative approach is that

scenarios of threats should be discussed and documented in
the qualitative approach.

Step 4: Analyze What Impact These Threats
Would Cause. Teams need to assess these threats by
analyzing what impact these threats would cause for1

organizations and their businesses. There are two different

approaches, quantitative and qualitative approaches, to
analyze what impact these threats would cause.

Quantitative Approach for Impact
Analysis. One of the popular approaches to calculate impact

is the single loss expectancy (SLE)

(Mealy, 2005). SLE is

equal to the value of a certain asset times percentage of

impact that a threat would cause on this certain asset (SLE

= asset value * percentage of impact). Percentage
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measurement of impact can also be called exposure factor
(EF)

(Mealy, 2005) .
Qualitative Approach for Impact

Analysis. Teams can use a simple scale to prioritize these

threats, which allow readers easily understand which

threats should be taken care of right away and which
threats will not be very harmful to the organizations.
There are two types of scales used in general. The first is

a scale with high impact, medium impact and low impact. The

second is a scale with 1 to 9 scores (Carbone, 2004). The
number '1• indicates less impact while the number '9•

represents severe impact to organizations. In order to use
the simple scale method, teams should also describe a

scenario of threats and potential consequences for a clear
understanding and documentation (Hansche, Berti, & Hare,

2004).
Step 5: Assess Vulnerabilities and

Likelihood. Assessing vulnerabilities and the likelihood of
occurrence can help teams identify what vulnerabilities
organizations have and their likelihood of occurrence. This

step can help teams clearly understand an organizations
weaknesses and strengths for building solid security
infrastructures in the future. There are two different
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approaches, quantitative and qualitative approaches, to
assess vulnerabilities and their likelihood.
Quantitative Approach for Assessing

Vulnerabilities and .Likelihood. Assigning estimated

percentages as likelihood can help teams calculate the
annualized loss expectancy (ALE)

(Meritt, 1998), prioritize

risks, and calculate total risk and residual risk (Harris,
2005) in the following steps. Estimated percentage is
called "the annualized rate of occurrence (ARO)"

(Harris,

2005) . It is based on a one-year timeframe to calculate .the
estimated percentage of a certain threat occurring. The

estimated number '0’ means that it will not take place. The

estimated number '1' means that it will take place once per
year, The estimated number that is larger than the number
'1' means that it will take place several times per year.
For example, using airplanes to attack an organization main

building may occur once in 2000 years, the value of ARO
will be 0.2% (1 / 2000 = 0.002 = 0.2%).

Qualitative Approach for Assessing
Vulnerabilities and Likelihood. Teams can use the same
simple scale method (Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2004) as the

previous step used for clearly documenting likelihood. If
teams use the scale with high impact, medium impact and low
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impact for prioritizing these threats by their impact at
the previous step, teams should use the same scale to

indicate likelihood at this step. If teams use the scale
with 1 to 9 scores at step 3, then teams should use the

same scale method at this step. Using the same scale method
for step 3 and step 4 can facilitate teams to perform

assessment, and analysis, and to prioritize risks at the
next step.
Step 6: Perform Assessment and Analysis, and
Prioritize Risks. Each the previous steps are preliminary
steps that lead to step 6 which assesses, analyzes and then

prioritizes risks. After assessing, analyzing, and
prioritizing risks, the developing teams are able to
allocate limited resources for risk mitigation and

management. Otherwise, it would not be easy to prevent
organizations from severe damages, such as loss of revenue.
There are two different approaches, quantitative and

qualitative approaches, to perform assessment and analysis
and to prioritize risks.

Quantitative Approach for Risk
Assessment, Analysis, and Prioritize. After collecting

sufficient information during the previous steps, teams can
use the industry accepted formula for calculating the
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annualized loss expectancy (ALE)

(Meritt, 1998). The

annualized loss expectancy (ALE) is an estimated monetary

loss on assets per year, which is caused by a certain
threat. The purpose of ALE is to provide teams with ideas

about how much the organization should spend for providing
protection. Teams can also calculate total risk and

residual risk. Total risk is all of the various kinds of

risks that organizations face if there is no protection at
all. Teams can multiply asset value by threats and

vulnerability for getting the value of total risk (total
risk = asset value * threats * vulnerability). Residual

risks are risks that have been left over to deal with. For
the value of residual risk (residual risk = total risk *

control gap), teams can multiply total risk by control gap
(Harris, 2005), which is the gap between risks that are
able to be controlled and risks that have been left to deal

with. After teams know all values of the ALE, total risk,

and residual risk, teams can start to prioritize risks.
Usually, the highest value of ALE should be protected first
while the low value of ALE should be protected last.

Qualitative Approach for Risk

Assessment, Analysis, and Prioritize. Developing teams now

can create the graph (See Figure 7 or Figure 8) for easily
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assessing, analyzing, and prioritizing risks. The X axis

represents business impact while the Y axis represents

likelihood. The difference between figure 7 and figure 8 is
the scale. In figure 7, the scale high, medium, and low are

used. In figure 8, the number '9', '6', and '3' are used.
The lower number means less likelihood of occurrence while

the higher number means higher likelihood of occurrence.

Developing teams can base decisions on information gathered
in steps 3 and 4 to prioritize risks. Developing teams

should focus more on higher business impact and likelihood
than lower business impact and vulnerability. Developing
teams can define different categories for prioritizing
risks (Department of Defense, 2006; Sherwood, 2005).

Developing teams also can define different colors for

representing different categories. Figure 7 and figure 8
illustrate how to utilize four categories and their colors

to prioritize risks. Category A, represented in red, means

that risks are severe, and these types of risks have the
most resources for risk mitigation. Category B, represented

in yellow, indicates that risks are significant. Category C,
represented in green, represents that risks are acceptable.

Category D, represented in blue, means that risks are
negligible.
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Figure 7. Risk Assessments and Analysis, and
Prioritize Risks (1)
Adopted from (Sherwood, 2005)

Likelihood

Figure 8. Risk Assessments and Analysis, and
Prioritize Risks (2)
Derived from (Sherwood, 2005)

Step 7: Select Countermeasures and

Protection Mechanisms. Risk prioritization, which i
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done

during the previous step, gives developing teams some ideas

about what the most critical risk is, how much it will cost
organizations if appropriate protection mechanisms have not

been implemented, and how much organizations should spend
on protection mechanisms. At this step, developing teams

start to take action to find the right countermeasures for
protecting organizations. The main purpose of this step is
to evaluate various kinds of countermeasure, and identify

which countermeasure is the most appropriate solution for a

certain critical risk. In comparing processes, developing

teams not only need to look for the best features of
countermeasures, but. also need to investigate different

cost scenarios by a cost/benefit analysis (Harris, 200.5).
Through the selection process, developing teams will know

which countermeasures can provide the most benefit to
organizations, and what the most advantage organizations

will gain from the chosen countermeasure if the target
countermeasures have been implemented successfully. In
other words, the chosen countermeasure should be of the

highest advantage to organizations among different
countermeasures. Selecting the best and right
countermeasures for organizations can reduce probability of
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risk taking place and reduce cost of damage if disasters

happen.
There are four methods (Department of Defense, 2007)
to mitigate risk. The first method is to avoid risk.

Developing teams can implement countermeasures to reduce or

eliminate risks. The second method is to control risk. Some

types of risk are controllable, such as employees'
misbehaviors. Employees can be trained to develop increased

awareness of security and to consciously change behaviors.
The third method is to transfer risk. One example is to use

honey-pot intrusion detection systems (IDS). The honey-pot
IDS acts like a honey pot, and can simulate vulnerable

systems, which can make intruders think that they have
found the target. This type of system can transfer risks

from the real system to simulating systems, which can

reduce damage to organizations .
The last one is to assume the level of risk. This type

of risk can be a very minor risk that will not hurt
organizations much. In addition, the cost of implementing
countermeasures and protection mechanisms is higher than

the monetary cost of damages resulting from risks. Hence,

assuming the level of risk may not be a bad idea in this

case.
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Step 8: Plan and Implement Risk Mitigation.
At this phase, developing teams can base decisions on the

chosen countermeasures or protection mechanisms to
establish a risk mitigation plan and implement it for

mitigating risk successfully (Department of Defense, 2007).
A risk mitigation plan should include requirements of

mitigating risks, risk mitigating approaches, detail
procedures about’ how to mitigate risks, and an

organizations previous history of mitigating risk. Support
from top managers to allocate budget and time is the main

factor for effectively implementing the plan.
The Role of Risk Management and Analysis in the

Zachman EA Framework. Risk management and analysis is an

important approach to analyze the current security state
and the gap, and to identify CSF. The result of assessing

risk becomes one driver for securing organizations and

their businesses. The assessing result can also be used to
drive through the detailed design of security controls at
different architectural levels. Figure 9 illustrates the

role of risk management and analysis in the business model
of the Zachman EA framework. The second and third steps of

risk management and analysis are to identify the current

assets, value, and threats. The fourth and fifth steps are
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to analyze the gap between the current security state and
the target security state by analyzing what impact

identified threats would cause, assessing vulnerabilities
and likelihood, performing assessment and analysis, and

prioritizing risk.

Contextual

Conceptual

| Step 6 Ir Prioritize
I Risks

|
ii
I

Figure 9. The Role of Risk Management and Analysis in
the Business Model of the Zachman EA
Framework Derived from (Carbone, 20'04;
Sherwood. 2005)
Alignment

Similar to alignment between businesses and IT

technology, alignment between businesses and security
technology plays an important role in an organizations

success. Emphasizing business more than security technology
or emphasizing security technology more than business will
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not bring maximizing benefit to an organization. The former

situation will create a lot of potential risk, while the
latter situation will cause organizations to spend too much

money on security controls than what optimal benefit
organizations gain. From the investment perspective, there
is an optimal cost/benefit point (See Figure 10 and Figure

11)

(Anderson & Choobineh, 2008; Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006)

between cost of potential impact from risk happening and

cost of security controls. This optimal point can make sure
that an investment is occurring in a cost-effective and

well-controlled manner. Therefore, alignment between
business and security technology is the best decision for

organizations, as illustrated.
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Figure 10. Optimal Investment Point
Adopted from (Fumy & Sauerbrey, 2006)

Percent of Best Practice Implemented:

Figure 11. Alignment between Best Security Practice
Implemented and Security Cost and Losses.
Adopted from (Anderson & Choobineh, 2008)

48

Business Architecture
The foundation of the Zachman EA framework includes
four essential architectures: business, data, application,

and technology architectures. The business architecture is

the graphical representation of the organization and the
business (Spewak, 1993) . The purpose is to provide an

essential and complete knowledge for developing the data

architecture, application architecture, and technology

architecture, and for the implementation phase (See Figure
12). Any model that can identify the organization unit that

is performing each business function should be included in
the business architecture. An organizational chart,

strategy model, goal model, and operating model are basic
elements for the business architecture (Ross, Weill, and
Robertson, 2006Spewak, 1993) . Developing teams can use
the business framework to construct the business

architecture. The current state is the current situation of
organizations and business, and the target state is the
state that organizations try to achieve, such as reducing

risk, lowering cost, increasing profile, or being more

competitive. Developing teams can simply base decisions on
the result of the business framework for constructing level

0 current state and target state. In addition, developing
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teams can also identify each business function with a brief

description, which can help for constructing the other

three architectures and implementation plan in the future.
Governance

Strategy &
Concept

I
Design
Phase

I
Implementation
Phase

I
Manage &
Measure Phase

Figure 12. life Cycle
Derived from (Sherwood,

2005;

Spewak,

1993)

Framework for Securing Data,
Application, and Technology
One essential principle of the Zachman EA framework is

to develop a data model, an application model, and a
technology model from the business model. Considerations

need to be taken that there are differences among
organizations as they differ in sizes, financial status,

reputations, organization charts, states of technical

environments, and so forth. That means that each
organization has different business models and security
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needs, which results in developing different data
architecture, application architecture, and technology

architecture for providing enterprise security.
Secure Information / Data
After defining business architecture, developers

should define the data architecture first because data is
the essential element of the information system function.

The data architecture identifies and defines key data,

which support the business functions. The data architecture
is the foundation for the systems design, physical database

design and database creation. In other words, it is a
vehicle for analyzing the logical structure of an

organization's information in the future. The data
architecture consists of data entities, attributes, and

relationships with other data entities. At the
implementation phase, analysts and designers will have time
to add more detail for creating the conceptual data

architecture.
In most cases, physical databases have existed before
creating the enterprise architecture. Hence, creation of
the data architecture has to be based on the current data

infrastructure, which is the current state of the data

architecture. The target state of the data architecture
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derives from the target state of the business architecture,

which includes business functions and key information.
Analyzing what the basic information blocks of the

organization needed for achieving the goals can generate
the list of sufficient data entities and the relationship
among these identified key data entities.

Security Services for Data Management Function. When
designing data architecture, developing teams should focus

on four essential security services: access control,
authorization,

authentication of SQL requests and responses,

and protection for data availability, integrity and

confidentiality (Sherwood, 2005). Access control to

different levels of data should be appropriately controlled
with appropriate privileges granted. Privileges can be

granted, based on subject roles or database function if

conventional databases are used. Authorization should be
granted, based on business needs. Authentication about

executing SQL codes should really be paid attention,

especially for accessing databases remotely. Protection for
data availability, integrity and confidentiality can be

achieved by various mechanisms. Applying various backup and
restoration techniques can keep data available. Atomic

transactions and commitment can maintain quality and
52

accuracy of stored data. Encrypting data can make sure that

only authorized subjects are able to access stored data.
For easily managing security services in the data

management systems, data classification and the designation

of roles must be applied. Developing teams can base on

sensitivity degree of data to classify data. Developing
teams can base decisions on an employee's position, tasks,

and business needs to design and assign them appropriate
accessing roles for accessing different levels of data. The

designation of roles can make authorizations and
authentications easy to perform in data management systems.

Security Guideline. Sensitive data includes, but is
not limited to, cost of products and employee data. Below
are some security guidelines (Harris, 2005) :

•

Sensitive data needed to be protected includes an

individual's education, social security number,
medical history, financial history, criminal

history, employment, and other similar types of
information.

•

Organizations cannot disclose this information

without written permission from the individual.
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•

The reason for gathering data must be specified

at the time of collection
•

Data cannot be used for other purposes

•

Unnecessary data should not be collected

•

Data should only be kept for as long as it is

needed to accomplish the stated task
•

Always backup

Secure Application / Information System
The application architecture can provide an overview

of major applications needed to manage the data and support
the business functions of an organization. The application

architecture is not a design for systems; rather it is a

definition of what major applications should take place for
managing data and providing functions for enterprise-wide
employees. It can help organizations achieve a stated

mission at an acceptable cost.
The current state of application architecture consists

of all applications that employees currently use for daily
operations. The target state of application architecture

will include all new application systems that can help an
organization resolve current critical problems and issues
at an acceptable cost. Examining opportunities and
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analyzing the business architecture for conceiving

opportunities and evaluating their contribution can provide
a clear idea about what new applications should be. Team
brainstorming also can generate good ideas about new

application systems.

Security Services Needed. The main focus for
application security is authorization. Developing teams

should focus on whether users are granted privileges
appropriately to perform the right tasks at the appropriate

levels in the right applications. For achieving this
mechanism, the application developers should include a few
essential services within the application architecture:
authorization, authentication, access control, audit,

application-to-application communication security, and

administration (Sherwood, 2005). The application
architecture should have the process of granting privileges,

and be able to verify whether users are authorized parties
and to make access decisions based on a user's

authorization status and authentication status.

In addition,

the application developers should include the process to

audit trails, which can tell administrators about who did
what at what time. Besides, developing teams should not

ignore security among each application-to-application
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communication. Confidentiality, integrity, authenticity,

and non-repudiation are needed security services for
application-to-application communication security. All
these processes and services should be appropriately

controlled by an administrator, which is referred to as
security administration.
Security Guidelines. Applications provide a way to

access data so access control for using applications

becomes an extremely import factor for security. Below are
some security guidelines (Harris, 2005) :
•

Only the necessary individuals who are required

to accomplish the stated tasks can be allowed to
use applications to access data
•

The person responsible for maintaining
applications and securely storing relative data
should not allow unintentional "leaking" of data.

Integrated Application Architecture. From the entire

application architecture perspective, the integrated
applications architecture (Sherwood, 2005) is the best
practical approach. The integrated application architecture

(See Figure 13) means that there are common data repository,
common interfaces, common services, and common external
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interfaces among all business applications. Each

application has accesses to common data repositories
through common interfaces. Normally, there is separate

layer between applications and common interfaces, and this
layer has two categories: common services and common
external interfaces. Examples of common services are

printing services or security services. Examples of common
external interfaces are web interface, banking interface,
or B-2-B Electronic Data Interface (EDI) interface.

Figure 13. An Integrated Applications Architecture
Adopted from (Sherwood, 2 005)

There are a few advantages (Sherwood, 2005) for this

wholly integrated application architecture. The first
advantage is usage simplification for users. This type of
application architecture not only asks users to simply sign
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in once for using business applications, but also provides

only one window (interface) for user administration. This
can reduce cost on training, support, and administration,

and it also can increase productivity. The other advantage

is that there is only one database for storing information
about authorization. This can simplify many processes for

better control and maintenance.

Secure Technology
The main purpose of technology architecture is to

provide appropriate environment for supporting business

operations. The environment can make needed data and
applications available to employees without concerning
geographic difference and issues of physical facilities.

Therefore, the first step of developing the technology

architecture is to define the major technology that could
provide all employees an environment for using applications
and managing data. At the architectural phase, developing

teams just need to 'define' major technology, such as the
pipeline and physical facilities of utilities. Developing

teams at this phase do not need to 'design' enterprise-wide
computing networks for supporting the business operations
with a shared data environment, as this will be done at the

design phase.
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Similarly with previous architectures, the current
state of technology architecture consists of all platforms

used for supporting current business. Developing teams
construct the target state of the technology architecture,

based on what business opportunities are, what business

operating needs are, and what platforms are needed for
using applications and managing data.
Strategies of Network Security. The network security

does not exist solely for protecting application and data,

it is also there for controlling and monitoring who and
what have been transmited through the network and at what
time. The goals of network security are to provide

protection to the network management flows, and to prevent

theft of bandwidth by unauthorized users. Appropriate
network management can provide users with a high-quality,

reliable and highly available connectivity (Sherwood,

2005) .

A number of organizations have applied different forms

of encryption technology for securing a network. However,
applying these encryption technologies, such as VPN, SSL,
TLS and IPSec, can provide only limited value for network
security. For deploying the valid network security services,

network security strategies should also be considered

simultaneously (Sherwood, 2005), which lists below.
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•

Security policy for Network: need to define
network domains, assign domain ownership, set
domain security policy, need awareness on
security policy, provide training on security

policy, and implement network security policy
successfully

•

Segregation of network domains: need to have

security gateways-firewalls at domain boundaries,
and need to have relative security rules for
firewalls to apply domain policy

o

Redundancy and resilience of network components:

need to have diverse routing,

few access points,

redundant equipments, and enough bandwidth for
business needs
•

Authentication of network entities: need to have

authentication for mutual node-to-node or routerto-router within the entire network, for external
entity at the network boundaries, and for
managing network services

•

Authorization of network entities: need to define
roles that are associated with external network

entities and define these roles' service profiles
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•

Boundary access control for network: need to have

security gateways or firewalls to control
boundary access for traffic from flowing into and
out of network domains, and relative rules for

restricting services

•

Connectivity control: need to have authorization
for connections, change control, and physical and
logical security standards for all network nodes

•

Management security for network: need to have

operator entities that are authorized, access

control, appropriate securing protocols for 'get'

and 'set', remote authentication for operator

entities, integration with system management
architectures, and integration with management

infrastructure
•

Integrity protection of network resource: need to

control software development lifecycle, control

production, control delivery, control
installation, control configuration, have

operational lifecycle, have integrity for

configuration data and routing table, and mange
change
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•

Monitoring network and intrusion detection for
network security: need to have instruction
detection, have even logging and analysis at
servers and majors network devices

®

Incident handling for network security: need to
include reporting, confirmation, escalation,

response, recovery, analysis, and lessons learned
•

Vulnerability research for network: need to
collect, collate and analyze advisory notices,

need to perform penetration intrusion test, and

need to gather internet intelligence, including
who is talking about us, what they are talking
about, and why they are talking about it
Strategic Principles of Platforms Security. There are

some strategic principles for designing security services

on platforms and environments. These strategic principles
include reducing vulnerabilities on platforms, segregating
and isolating execution platforms and environments from

development and tests platforms and environments. These

principles also provide and maintain trusted platforms and
environments for processing sensitive data and provide
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secure storage for storing sensitive non-volatile data
(Sherwood, 2005).

In addition to these strategic principles, developing
teams could also focus on some major platform security

services. Physical and environmental security for
protecting platforms is the essential category of platform
security services. The next category of major platform

security services regards controlling local access and
remote access. This includes user authentication, user

access control, and audit trails. The next platform
security service is to provide cryptographic services from

local sub-systems. Local sub-systems can be hardware and
software. The fourth category is to provide anti-virus

services for protecting platforms, detecting intruders,
reporting the status of platforms, restoring and recovery
platforms back from virus and other malicious software

attacks. The fifth category of platform security services
provides control and management, such as change control,

configuration control, security administration, operations
management, and so on. The last category is to plan ahead

for procedures on how to backup and to recover from
disasters.
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Technology Architecture. There are many ways to
establish architectures for systems, platforms, and
networking. Generally speaking, the more common secure
architectures (See Figure 14) include outer hardened

perimeter with a gateway, and few internal hardened

perimeters with a gateway at different layers (Sherwood,
2005), as shown in Figure 14. Within different internal
perimeters, the honeycomb model of security can be applied.
The honeycomb model of security can make sure that
privilege to access to one cell of the honeycomb cannot

access to other cells of the honeycomb. The multi-layer
hardened perimeter protection can make it hard for hackers
to access the most sensitive data within the most internal

perimeter. It can reduce the degree of damage when some
disasters occur as well.
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Figure 14. Common Secure Architectures
Adopted from (Sherwood, 2005)

Security Framework - The Life Cycle of
Developing Security Policies
From security perspectives, security policy is a
starting point for securing organizations. Security policy

is designed to define how organizations protect and
maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability

of data resources, information systems, and network

resources (Harris, 2005). In addition to ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data
resources, information systems, and network resources,

developing security policies ensure compliance with
external and internal requirements. External requirements
are derived from laws and regulations for specific
industries. Internal requirements not only can be derived
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from the organization's business objectives, mission, and
policies, but also can be derived from the needs for
reducing risks, avoiding disasters, or compliant with
standards, such as ISO 27000-series, CoBit, and ITIL.
Another benefit of developing and maintaining security
policies is to demonstrate the practice of 'due care' and

'due diligence'

(Harris, 2005) within organizations.

Develop and Maintain Security Policies
Before developing and maintaining security policies,

there is one essential preliminary phase. The preliminary

phase is to build a solid foundation (Walker & Cavanaugh,
1998), which prepares all needs for developing security

policies. The second phase is to develop security policies,
followed by communicating with users and then implementing

it. Developing teams also need to manage incident, which
can prevent organizations from being hurt twice by the same

incident. For ensuring a quick and effective response to
security incidents, defining incident response is a must.
The next step is auditing. This step monitors for

compliance to security policies. The last phase is to

regularly review security policies and update them. Figure
15 briefly depicts the entire cycle of developing and

maintaining security policies (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998).
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Build a Solid Foundation

Figure 15. The Cycle of Developing and Maintaining
Security Policies
Derived from (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998)

Build a Foundation. The preliminary phase of

developing and maintaining security policies includes many
steps (See Figure 16). The first step is to establish a
mission statement (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998) . A mission

statement should not be too long. Short and clear mission
statements can be easily understood in terms of overall

goals or objectives of developing security policies and can
help developing teams focus on security policies.
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The second step is to identify the organization's

assets. The process includes knowing all items that needed
to be protected to ensure integrity, confidentiality, and
availability. In addition, the process needs to record the

items location and owners. Summarizing all this information
in documentation can assist in further analysis for
developing security policies (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998) .

Figure 16. The Preliminary Phase of Developing and
Maintaining Security Policies
Derived from (Walker & Cavanauqh, 1998)
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After identifying which assets need protection, the
next step is to prepare needs for management support (Fedor

et al., 2003). Management support plays an important role
for implementing security policies effectively and

efficiently (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). This step entails
briefly gathering requirements from external and internal
environments and to develop a draft budget. External

environmental requirements refer to those from legal,
regulative and auditory requirements. Internal
environmental requirements derive from business needs,

which includes organizational objectives, missions, and all
areas or aspects that need to be protected for securing the
entire enterprise and business units. In addition to

gathering brief legal requirements and business needs,
developing a draft budget is a must for applying financial
support from management. Budgets should include cost for
time, personnel who will be involved in developing security
policies, supporting hardware and software equipments for

developing security policies (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998) .
Brief risk assessment (Refer to the session 'Risk

management and Analysis') is a good tool to gather internal
security needs. Information collected from the brief risk
assessment also can be used for persuading managers into
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supporting the project. After managers support the project
and allocate budget and time, developing teams should start
to gather external and internal requirements in detail for

developmental, implemental, and maintaining purposes
(Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998).
For successfully developing and implementing security

policies, upper management needs to be involved in the

project and strongly support the project (Lam, 2005) . A
proposal with a report of external and internal
requirements and a draft assessing budget can easily
persuade managers to support the project of developing and
implementing security projects. Having management support
and authorization can resolve money and time issues. These

managers can allocate the required budgetary needs and

allow sufficient time for development and implementation.

In addition, top managers have power to affect processes by
enforcing employees to do participate (Kearns & Sabherwal,

2006).
Before beginning to develop security policies for the

entire organization, developing teams should be very clear
about what security policies organizations should have, and

what the organization is going to protect. All requirements
derived from laws, regulations, and business needs should
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be gathered and translated into security policies. Risk
analysis (Refer to the session 'Risk management and

Analysis') for the entire organization should be complete
because risk analysis can help developing teams understand
the security status of an organization and prevent

disasters from happening. Nevertheless, good security
policies should balance between protection and productivity
for an organization (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998) .

The foundation for developing and maintaining security
policies is an important approach to analyze the current
security state, the target security state and the gap, and
also to identify CSF. Critical success factors, which

result from assessing and analyzing risks, become drivers
for securing organizations and their businesses. Therefore,

these CSF should be transferred to security polices, and
then drive through the detailed design of security controls

at different architecture levels. Figure 17 illustrates the
role of this phase in the business model of the Zachman EA

framework.
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Contextual

Conceptual

Step 7- Risk
Analysis

Step 3 & 6

Figure 17. The Role of this Phase in the Business Model
of Zachman EA Framework
Derived from (Carbone, 2004: Sherwood, 2005)

Develop Security Policies. Security policies are high-

level statements that define an organizations high-level
security philosophy. Security policies describe an
organizations goals, missions, or objectives, and contain
top manager's directives to create security programs,

assign responsibilities, and to establish goals,

measurement, and target (Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2 0 04) .
Security policies also can identify how organizations are

compliant with legal systems, and how organizations are
going to mitigate risks (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998).

Types of Policies. Security policies can fall
into three categories: regulatory, advisory, and

informative (Harris, 2 0 05) . Regulatory types of security
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policies derive from laws or regulation. Organizations

'must' comply with these requirements. Advisory types of
security policies strongly suggest to employees what
'should' or 'should not' be done within an organization. It

would be advisable to mention possible ramifications if
employees do not comply with advisory types of security

polices. Informative types of security policies, the final
category, provide information to employees about certain

topics. Informative types of security policies do not force

employees to do something or not to do something. In other
words, employees 'may/might' or 'may/might not' comply with

informative security policies.

Policies, Standards, Guidelines, and Procedures.

Developing security policy does not entail only developing
policies. It also entails development of security standards,
guidelines and procedures for supporting policies. Security
policies are like strategic goals while standards,

guidelines, and procedures are like tactical tools.
Effective security policies frequently refer to standards
and guidelines. Clearly distinguishing these terms and

understanding what roles these terms play in developing
security policies can help developing team members
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communicate effectively, and make development and

implementation successful.
Policies are brief statements, high-level security
philosophy, and technology- and solution-independent (The
SANS Institute, 2008) . Standards are a collection of
external, internal, system-specific, or procedural-specific

requirements, and provide measurable information in each

policy. Standards are mandatory so all employees must

comply with these standards. Guidelines provide system
specific or procedural specific recommendations. All

employees are not required to comply with guidelines, but
are strongly advised to comply with these guidelines for
best practice. Procedures, the lowest level in the

hierarchical structure of security policies, describe step-

by-step tasks that should be performed to achieve goals.

Procedures are closest to computers and users, comparing

with policies, standards, and guidelines. For instance,
procedures can contain detailed steps of configuration and

installation. Figure 18 illustrates the hierarchical
structure among policies, standards, guidelines, and

procedures.

74

Figure 18. The Hierarchical Structure
Derived from (Harris, 2005: Walker &
Cavanaucrh, 199 8)
Steps of Developing Security Policies. Five

essential steps of developing security policies are
synthesized from research (Harris, 2005; Walker & Cavanaugh,

1998). These five steps are 'assign people who should be on
the team',

'define security policy topics and assign

responsibilities',

policies',

'define written components of security

'develop policies, standards, guidelines, and
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procedures', and 'review security policies for approval'.

Figure 19 illustrates the flow of the development phase.

Figure 19. Develop Security Policies
Derived from (Harris, 2005; Walker
& Cavanaucth. 199 8)

Step 1: Assign People Who Should be on the
Team for Developing Security Policies. After the
preliminary phase, managers strongly support the project,
and allocate budget and time. Organizational and business

needs, legal requirements, and the result of risk analysis
are gathered. The next step is to form a team to develop
security policies. It is a good idea to have security

professionals and technical personnel on the team. For best

practice, having other specific professional people on the
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team can avoid having blind spots. These specific
professional people can come from a legal department, human

resources department, audit and technical department, and
so forth. Senior professional managers are the best
candidates for developing security policies because
security policies are high-level security philosophy, and
contains managerial direction to create security programs,

mitigate risks, assign responsibilities, and establish

goals, measurement, and target (Hansche, Berti, & Hare,
2004). These specific senior professional managers involved
in development can also make implementation efficiently and

effectively. Reasons are that they know their professional
fields well, they are very familiar with their departmental
status and subordinates, and they have the power to

influence subordinates to comply with security policies.
Step 2: Define Security Policy Topics and

Assign Responsibilities. Developing teams can start to

define the scope of the project and define security policy

topics. After security policy topics are defined, based on
their hard and soft skills, professional fields, and
positions within the organization, all team members can be
assigned roles and responsibilities for developing policies
and implementation.
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Step 3: Define Written Components of

Security Policies. Defining written components of security
policies can give all developing team members some ideas
about how to write a security policy and what should be

written for each security policy. There are six essential

sections that are strongly advised to be written for each

security policy: statement of purpose, scope, policy
statement, enforcement, exceptions, and additional

considerations (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). The statement of
purpose simply describes the main purpose, such as the

reason why the policy was developed and what is to be
protected. The scope has to mention the policy's

application, the technical platforms that the policy

applies to, and an explanation of the types of information,
definitions, and what is covered under the policy. The
l
policy statement has to mention roles that are responsible
for the policy, and their responsibility. This means that

the policy statement should contain who is going to monitor

for compliance to the security policy, and rules of

implementation. Usually IS groups and internal audit groups
are in charge of monitoring for compliance to the security

policy. Enforcement sessions should describe who is

responsible for enforcing the security policy. He/she
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should be at a management level. An exceptions session is
to include exception situations. The last session,

additional considerations, can contain dates for developing
policy or revising policy. It also can include names and

departmental connection of those that develop policy.

Step 4: Develop Policies, Standards,
Guidelines, and Procedures. For effectively and efficiently

implementing and maintaining security policies, developing

teams should follow the fundamental principles below for
developing security policies.
Principle A - Simple Writing Format and

Style. The security policy will be distributed within the

entire organization. Readers could be technical personnel,
or non-technical personnel who are in management positions
(Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). Therefore, easily understanding
the security policy for all relevant people is the

principle of producing the security policy.

Principle B - Policy Flexibility.
Security policy should be flexible. Security policies

usually remain applicable for some period of time until
organizational business, operational objectives, or

environments have a fundamental change (Hansche, Berti, &
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Hare, 2004). Therefore, security policies should be
hardware and software independent.

Principle C - Modulation - Efficiently
Managing Security Policies. Developing teams can modularize

the complete security policies by keeping standards,

guidelines, and procedures separate and modular in nature
(Harris, 2005). This method can make distribution and
updating easier in the future. The section 'Standards' can

be distributed to managers while the section 'guidelines'

and the section 'procedures' can be distributed to IT
administrators or operators.

Step 5: Review Security Policies for
Approval. Once security policies have been developed, they

need to be reviewed and used to collect feedback from
technical employees, non-technical employees, and top

managers (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). Communicating with
users is an essential step to make sure that all parties
are involved in developing security policies and have an

opportunity to contribute their efforts. This process can
ensure that the security policy is compliant with business
needs, organizational policies, and legal requirements.

Communicate with Users. For effectively and
efficiently implementing security policies, communicating
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efficiently with users is an essential preliminary phase.
Some security policies may affect internal cultures and

employees daily operating behaviors, which is the hardest
factor for teams to deal with. Efficient communication
which requires employees to change cultures and existing
daily operations in order to be compliant with security
policies is necessary to achieve the desired end result.

Effective communication plays an essential'role in
resolving these types of outcome issues. Effectively
communicating with users can ensure that all understand

security policies and accept to apply security policies.

Teams also can record what those who were/are involved in

developing security policies have read, understood, and
agreed to obey in the security policies (Weise & Martin,
2001). Both effectively communicating with users and
establishing a record can make implementation of security
policies more efficient.

Implement Security Policies. Different organizations

have different methods to implement security policies.
Organizations vary in size, business type, needs, the
policy itself, the technology used, finance, and so forth
(Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). These factors affect methods of

implementing security policies. Below lists some of the
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issues that implementing teams might face (Walker &
Cavanaugh, 1998) :

•

Should security policies be implemented at once

or by groups

•

Should security policies be implemented as a

whole or should they be based on priority to
implement parts

•

Should security policies be implemented by
geographic area first or all at once if
organizations are multi-national organizations

Implementation phase probably is the hardest phase in
the life cycle of developing and maintaining security

policies. Many organizations fail in this phase. For

effectively and efficiently implementing security policies,
teams need to resolve many issues. It could result from the

lack of strong management support (Fedor et al., 2003; Lam,

2005), lack of budget (Kearns & Sabherwal, 2006; Martin,
Pearson, & Furumo, 2007), lack of

implementation time

(Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998), lack of strong leadership

(Fedor et al., 2003), lack of awareness of benefits of
implementing security policies-"why for" (Hansche, Berti, &

Hare, 2004), or ineffective communication with users
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(Jackson, Chow, & Leitch, 1997; Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998) .

Resolving all of the above issues can help to successfully

implement security policies.
Define Incident Response and Manage Incidents.
Defining incident response and managing incidents can
minimize the impact that incidents may cause. Good incident

management can also make teams more aware of security

weakness from these incidents occurring, and then establish
solutions for preventing it from occurring next time.

Therefore, it would be good practice for organizations. In

this phase, there are three steps: define incident response,
manage incidents, and review and update security policy
(See Figure 20). Managing incidents includes three sub
steps: quickly response incidents, effectively handle
incidents, and clearly document incidents (See Figure 20).
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Incident
Report

Figure 20. The Flow of Defining Incident Response
and Managing Incident
Derived from (Harris, 2005; Walker &
Cavanaugh, 1998)

Step 1: Define Incident Response. Planning

incident response before actual incidents occur is
necessary. One of the advantages of planning ahead is that
key employees can have a clear picture about what kinds of

incidents may occur, and how to react to different
incidents appropriately (Harris, 2005). The other advantage

is that these key employees can be trained with the

necessary skills to appropriately react to different
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categories of incidents before actual incidents occur
(Walker & Cavanaugh, 199 8) .

Defining incident response should focus on developing
reacting scenarios for each incident, based on the kind of
violating security policy (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). These

scenarios should be clearly defined in detail.
Most security incidents will fall into the five
categories below (Hansche, Berti, & Hare, 2004):
•

Attack type: terrorist attack, hacker attack,

virus attack, malicious code attack, and insider

attack
•

Unethical type: competitive intelligence
gathering

•

Unauthorized type: employee unauthorized action

•

Misbehavior type: employee error

•

Hardware and software malfunction type

Step 2: Manage Incidents. There are three
major tasks for incident management: response incidents to

incident report, handle incidents, and document incidents.

When incidents occur, employees should follow the defined
procedures at the previous step for responding to incidents.

Auditing trials may be needed for investigation. Teams can
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use forensic techniques, which is like a tool to assist

with computer security incident response, to collect,
examine, analyze, and report incidents (Kent, Chevalier,

Grance, & Dang, 2006). The purpose of investigation is to
determine how and why the incident occurred, which can help

teams apply appropriate correction approaches. After

incidents have occurred and have been handled, teams should
discuss and document these actual incidents, and then
distribute these documentations to key employees. The focus

of discussion and documentation should be on the

description of incidents, causes (e.g. security weaknesses,
missing steps, not follow processes, or procedural
problems), how to discover incidents, procedures of how to
fix these problems that caused incidents, monitor

procedures, summarization of what was learned, and

recommendation for updating the security policy (Killcrece,
Kossakowski, Ruefle, & Zajicek, 2003).

Step 3: Review Security Policy and Make
Modification If Needed. Reviewing and updating security

policy each time when organizations are hit by incident.
Identifying the causing reason first can help teams to know

which policies should be reviewed carefully and make
modification. This step is like a prevention step, which
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can prevent organizations from being hit again by the same
incident.

Audit for Compliance to Security Policies. It is

always a great practice to monitor for compliance to
security policies (Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). Auditing for

compliance can allow for a certain degree of control to
security. Usually, this action can be taken by information
security officers,

internal audit groups, external auditors,

consultants, or the U.S. state auditors if organizations
are in regulated industries.

Regularly Review and Update Security Policies.

Security policies should be reviewed regularly and updated

if needed (Weise & Martin, 2001) . Regularly reviewing and
updating process can translate essential changes within

organizations into security policies, which can ensure that

security policies will not become obsolete in the future.
For effectively implementing updated security policies,
regularly reviewing and updating processes, personnel

involved, and those who must sign-off on the changes should

be clearly indicated and understood.
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Why Always Fail in "Why For" Developing
Security Policies
Many security police developers know "how-to" develop

security policies, but always fail in "why for"

(Hansche,

Berti, & Hare, 2004) . There are few reasons for this
situation. First of all, top managers do not offer strong

support to develop and implement security policy. That
means that top managers think that security policies are

just statements and are not worthy of spending too much
time and money for developing and implementing this
security project. The result is that top managers or
decision makers do not allocate enough budget and time

towards developing and implementing teams. Second, the
leader and team members of developing and implementing

teams do not believe that this security project is worthy
of completion. Hence, they are just doing the minimum work

that is required to do, such as documenting security

policies only. Third, the top team leader's leadership is
not strong enough to successfully develop and implement

security policies within the entire organizations (Fedor,

et al., 2003) .

Some actions can be taken to prevent this situation
from happening. Emphasizing legal requirements, risks that
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organizations have, and cost that organizations may be

incur if risks have not been addressed is a useful action.
Educating or training top managers or decision makers to

strongly believe in the usefulness that security policies
have in an organization is also a good idea, but may be

harder to do. The leader and team members who are in charge
of the security policies project should have a strong sense
of security, and the leader should be carefully chosen.

Chosen criteria should not only be based on hard-skills,
but also base on soft-skills. Strong soft-skills can save a
lot of effort for making a security policies project

successful.

The Role of Security Framework
In Zachman EA Framework
The Zachman EA framework is one of top-down approaches.

Developing and maintaining security policy is also one of
top-down approaches. Figure 21 illustrate the role of

security framework in Zachman EA framework.
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Figure 21. The Life Cycle of the Zachman EA Framework and Security Framework
Derived from (Sherwood. 2005; Soewak. 1993; Walker & Cavanaucrh. 1998)

CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS

Chapter five and six discuss the gap analysis of the L

system in access control, information security incident

management, and business continuity management (BCM) for
one chosen organization, and suggest a best practice model

of developing security policy, access control and
information security incident management modeled ProVison
(Metastorm, 2008). Recently, the organization set a

security goal for being compliant with security standard,
ISO 17799 2005. To effectively achieve the main goal

eventually, developers not only need to have a well

developed plan that aligns IT security with business
security needs, but also need to identify what critical
tasks are and what should be worked on first. Applying the

framework developed in the research, performing gap
analysis can help developers easily identify CSF. This
chapter summarizes the result of analyzing the gap.

The scope of the case is the L system, concentrating

on analyzing access control, information security incident
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management, and BCM. The target of this case is compliant

these three aspects with ISO security standard.
The first step is the assessment of the current state.

Conducting questionnaires of access control, information

security incident management, and BCM, based on business
model of the organization. Interviewing with IT personnel

is necessary to gather needed data in this study. The

topics of questionnaires are presented in Table 1, 2, and 3.
The gap analysis is performed based on the data

collected.
The result of performing gap analysis will be

presented by graphic charts only. In fact, these graphic

charts also can illustrate how easily weakness, strength,
and CSF can be identified for planning further potential /

candidate projects.
In figure 22, 23, and 24, X axis represents control

areas for access control, information security incident

management, and business continuity management. The number

represents different control areas. Table 1, 2, and 3
depict these control areas. Y axis represents what

percentage of compliance with ISO 17799 2005. The number
'0' represents nothing has been done at all while the

number '100' represents full compliance with ISO security
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standard. If percentage of compliance is lower than 50,

that means those control areas should be paid attend

immediately. All percentage of compliance is presented in
table 1, 2, 3 as well.
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CHAPTER SIX

RESULTS AND IMPLICATION

According to the figures (22, 23, and 24) shown below,

access control has a lot of rooms for improvement while
information security incident response and business

continuity management have been controlled well. Figure 22
shows that many control areas have not been done well yet.

Some control areas even have not been taken any action at
all although few control areas have been full compliant

with ISO 17799 2005. Low percentage of compliance with ISO
security standard means that there is high likelihood that
threats will occur. Based on the result, it is so easy to
pinpoint out which areas will become apparently vulnerable
and should be taken immediately action, such as control

area #5 and #10 in figure 22, which have zero percentage of

compliance. Good news for this organization by observing
the result shown in Figure 22 is that three control areas

(#7, #10, #20) have one hundred percentage of compliance

with ISO standard.
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Table 1. Access Control
Control
Area

Access Control

1

Access Control Policy

2
3
4
5

User Registration
Privilege Management
User password management
Review of user access rights

6
7

Password Use
Unattended user equipment

8

Policy on use of network services
User Authentication for external
connection
Equipment identification in networks
Remote diagnostic Port protection

9

10
11
12
13
14

Segregation in network
Network Routing Control
Secure log-on procedures

Percentage
of
Compliance
33.33
34.78
16.67
66.67
0
66.67
100
60

50
0

66.67
100
66.67

50

15

User identification and
authentication

16
17
18

Use of systems' utilities
Session time-out
Limitation of connection time

19
20
21

Information access restriction

50
83.33

Sensitive system isolation
Teleworking

100
76.32
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83.33
68.75
83.33

Figure 23, information security incident management,
has been controlled well. All five control areas have more

than fifty percentage of compliance with ISO 17799 2005.
Three out of five have one hundred percentage of compliance

with the industry security standard. This shows that the

organization can quickly response to some expected or
unexpected events and effectively take right actions for
these events.
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Table 2. Information Security Incident Management
Percentage
Control
Information Security Incident
of
Area
Management
Compliance
Reporting information security events
1
66.67
Reporting security weaknesses
2
100
Responsibilities and procedures
3
68.75
Learning from information security
4
incidents
100
Collection of evidence
5
100

Informalton Security Incident
Management

Control Area

Figure 23. Information Security Incident Management

Figure 24, the last figure, also can demonstrate that
BCM have been well controlled, except control area #5.

Control area #5 is 'testing, maintaining and re-assessing
business continuity', which only has 37.5% of compliance.

That means that a well developed BCM plan does not have
much opportunity to examine whether the BCM plan is
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appropriate and applicable for quickly reaction to severe
events and reduction impact of cost to less. Low percentage
of compliance also means that the well developed BCM plan

may not work as expected in the real world. Despite the

control area #5, the organization has more than 85% of
compliance in business continuity management, which
indicates that the organization may be able to quickly get
business back in normal after getting hit.

Table 3. Business Continuity Management
Control
Area
1
2

3
4
5

Business Continuity Management
Including information security in the
business continuity management
process
Business continuity and risk
assessment
Developing and implementing
continuity plans including
information security
Business Continuity planning
framework
Testing, maintaining and re-assessing
business continuity
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Percentage
of
Compliance

100
100

88.89

97.3
37.5

Business Continuity Management

0
0
r!
d
rd
&
§

o

100
oo nu

co nU

Al

£

40 OZ HU
illi
o j

■
1

<

IIS

- *

, ,y.

■

■;. -.mu

* rv< ■ ■ -

iHi

3

2

* 7 WX ■ '■ t,-*1

’KvWr
Blu ’A-.'S"
■fV’
iiti fiK-X tpil
A; ...- —
'<
—

4

5

Control Area

Figure 24. Business Continuity Management

The next step of this study is to develop a best

practice framework, which is modeled using ProVision, for
the organization. Before starting to demonstrate the best

practice models, the overall business framework and L

system is presented from Appendix A to J.
Due to data restriction, only information security
incident management will be addressed at this point. From
the table and bar chart (See Table 2 and Figure 23),

'reporting information security events' and

'responsibilities and procedures' only have about 66% to
69% of compliance with security ISO standard. The main

reason of the low percentage of compliance for the former

case is the lack of formal security incident response
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policy, which describes how to report events. The
organization only has security standard and process of
security incident response. The recommendation here is to

develop a formal and written security incident response

policy. Appendix K, L, and M illustrate the best practice
security framework first, followed by illustrating the best
practice of developing security policy and the flow of
effectively implementing one security policy. Following
these strategies, the organization is able to develop

useful security incident management policy.
For the latter one "responsibilities and procedures",
the main reason of low percentage is lack of well

documented guidelines for the complete cycle of responding
and handling incidents. Well written guidelines can easily

identify responsibilities of each role of responding, and
handling incidents, and provide clear guidelines of

managing incidents. Appendix N, 0, and P illustrate the
best practice strategy for security incident response

policy, followed by presenting the main scope of incident

response policy in L system, and then the best practice

workflow. The workflow demonstrates the complete cycle of
managing security incident. One of essential steps for

improvement is to follow written guidelines of responding
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incidents for ensuring a quick, effective, and orderly
response to information security incidents. In addition,

determining and implementing countermeasures are
recommended for preventing the same incident from happening
again (Harris, 2005; Walker & Cavanaugh, 1998). After this
step, all information relevant to incidents should be

documented, including what the incident is about, what the
impact the incident makes, how to handle it in what method,
how to prevent it happened again, and so on. The last step

should also review the security policy and make
modification if needed. This complete cycle not only can

well handle security incident correctly and efficiently,
but also can ensure the same incident will not happen again

in the future.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Security is important for all organizations,

especially for large enterprises. Inappropriate security

management can make critical events threaten organizations'
bottom line, such as loss of reputation, customers' trust,

fortune, confidential information, and so on. Incorporating

security dimension into Zachman EA framework is a good

practice for securing organizations efficiently and
effectively. Zachman EA framework is a blueprint for the

entire organizations. It allows developing teams, such as
EA teams, to well align business and IT security, and
transform business needs into IT security business value.

Well developing plan can positively affect the quality of

implementation and have less unexpected implementing errors.
Strong top management support and applying top-down
governance can make development and implementation

successful to deliver value for organizations. Strong top
management supports not only means "approval" for

allocating enough time and budget, but also involve getting
top managers to participate for successful development and
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implementation. The reason is that these top managers have

power to enforce different departments on cooperation, and
eventually make the entire project successful. Applying
top-down governance not only can efficiently develop

settings and plans, but also can ensure organizations

conform to well-developing plans. Top-down governance can

efficiently control and monitor the state of enterprise
security by looking all as one. All considerations will

also be consistent within the entire enterprise. Top-down
governance also can make communication easily because,

general speaking, there are just two ways of communications:
up-to-down or down-to-up communication.
The paper starts from presenting an effective

governance approach, followed by presenting the framework

from two perspectives. One is from EA perspective while the

other is from security perspective. The first section is

very useful for EA personnel to look at security dimension.
The second section can help security personnel to see the
whole picture of enterprise security easily, and how to fit

into the Zachman EA framework.

In addition, this paper not only presents framework
itself, but also illustrates developing processes of the
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framework. This can provide developing teams as a standard
or guideline for developing enterprise plan.

Applying the framework developed here can easily

pinpoint security strengths and weaknesses of organizations,
effectively develop the most appropriate security blueprint,
and efficiently implement cost-effective security projects

for enhancing security regularly. These benefits of

applying the enterprise security framework is demonstrated
in chapter five and six. In these two chapters, one
organization has been applied using the framework developed

in this research. Analyzing business framework and gap has

been done by conducting questionnaires and interviews, and
applying one step of risk assessment and analysis-assess

vulnerabilities. Gap analysis can help developers easily
identify CSF for achieving the target by prioritizing

factors. At the last section of chapter six, a best

practice model is suggested. These models are developed
using Provision.
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APPENDIX A
THE BUSINESS FRAMEWORK INTERVIEW OUTLINES (Carbone, 2004)
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KEY
Group 1 = Officers/Key Business Experts, CIO
Group 2 = Key Opinion Leaders (Business, IT)
Group 3 = Key IT Leaders

Group 1 Questions

As an officer of (organization):
1. What is (organization) vision/mission?
2. What is CIO vision/mission? ,

3. What are (organization)/CIO goals/objectives?
4. What are this year's key business initiatives/major
programs?

5. Identify longer-term stress points or risks in the
IT organization (major concerns).

6. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
(organization) business (e.g., skill deficit, low

turnover). These are characteristics for which the
organization is known.

7. List the major current (short-term) challenges the

organization faces.
8. List the major environmental changes (organization)
IT faces,

(e.g., new technology)
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9. What are potential growth/expense reduction

opportunities to which (organization) IT could
contribute?

10. Describe significant "history" or changes in
business direction (e.g., e-business, mergers and

acquisitions, consolidations, deregulation, new
ventures, new technology).

11. Describe the (organization)

"culture" and identify

the major themes or motivational forces that impact
the behavior of the organization.

12. Identify key constraints (e.g., regulatory,
legislative, shareholder considerations)

How would the business behave if:
®

Stress points were relaxed/risks mitigated?

•

Weaknesses were addressed and strengths fortified?

•

Challenges were resolved?

®

•

Environmental changes were accounted for?
Growth/expense reduction opportunities were

leveraged?
•

The "world was perfect?"

107

Group 2 Questions

As a key opinion leader:

1. Identify longer-term stress points or risks in the
IT organization (major concerns).

2. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
(organization) IT business (e.g., skill deficit, low

turnover). These are characteristics for which the
organization is known.

3. List the major current (short-term) challenges

(organization) IT faces. You can often tell a
challenge by the fact that several different groups
are working to address it.

4. List the major environmental' changes (organization)
IT faces (e.g., new technology).

5. What are potential growth/expense reduction
opportunities to which (organization) IT could

contribute? You can sometimes recognize a potential
growth opportunity by the fact that a new idea or
"buzzword" has cropped up and everyone wants to be

associated with it.

6. Identify organization size in annual expenses and
number of employees by organization (e.g., Marketing,

IT) .
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7. List number and types of customers.

8. List users/customers of IT

9. List locations served and serving.
10. List key products and services.

11. List high-level organization structure and process
flow.

12 . Show organization structure for IT
13 . Show processes/flow used for CIO
14 . List sales channels (website, call centers, etc.)

15 . List key partners/suppliers/vendors.
16 . List key reports or indices.

How would the organization/IT behave if:
o

Stress points were relaxed/risks mitigated?

•

Weaknesses were addressed and strengths fortified?

•

Challenges were resolved?

•

Environmental changes were accounted for?

•

Growth/expense reduction opportunities were

leveraged?
o

The "world was perfect?"

In the "ideal" future:
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1. How will customers and suppliers interact with us
(e.g., "suppliers will accept our orders
electronically. ")?

2. What will the future high-level business function

flow look like?

3. What key business information will flow through the
process?

4. What critical people plans and skills will be in
place (e.g., "There is a single, cross-trained IT

organization.")? What critical support processes and
structures will be in place (e.g.,

"The new skills

assessment process is used by all managers.")?

5. What key enabling capabilities will enable the

desired state (e.g., "We have the capability for a
customer with a service problem to reach a live

agent from the web site.")

Group 3 Questions

As an IT leader/manager, please describe:
1. Number and types of customers

2. Users/customers of IT services

3. Locations served and serving
4. Data center/storage/distribution locations
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5. Network and user locations
6. High-level organization structure and process flow
7. Organization structure for IT

8. Processes/flow used for IT

9. Key suppliers/vendors
10. Key reports or indices
11. Indices/measures for IT

12 Current technologies:
- Network, severs, and operating systems

- Communications services - pair-wise interfaces,
APIs, messaging, etc.

- Development/analysis tools
- External interfaces (e.g., external systems &
databases)

- Data management software
extract ion/cleansing/mapping, DW/DBMS,

repository, modeling, etc.

13. Major applications (CRUD) and databases
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APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION CHART
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APPENDIX C
STRUCTURE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENTS
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IT Division
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Services

Enterprise
Management
System

Data Center and
Help Desk

Technical
Support
(Application)

Information
Security

Data Center

Help Desk
Services

Training
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Telecommunications
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APPENDIX D

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
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APPENDIX E
STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
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APPENDIX F
GOALS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
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Enhance
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business
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through IT
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APPENDIX G

GOALS FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
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126

4

Enhance
and enrich
business
growth
through IT
security

Provide a

reliab e and

integrated IT
T

—security—

A

infrastructure

Design,
implement,
and maintain a

IT security
infrastructure

to accomplish
three

fundamantai
principles of

Expand and

Develop

Explore

improve IT

plans and

revenue

security

policies that

enhancements

services to

can

and cost

meet stated

effectively

sharing

goals and

implement

alternatives to

objectives

needed FT

meet user

security

demands

projects

security:
availability,

integrity and
confidentiality

127

Develop a plan

to safeguard

the entire
organization,
including

assets and IT

infrastructures

APPENDIX H

SUBSIDIARY EXISTING SECURITY POLICY
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APPENDIX I
CORPORATE SECURITY POLICY
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APPENDIX J

THE L SYSTEM - BUSINESS PROCESS
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APPENDIX K
SECURITY FRAMEWORK
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APPENDIX L

DEVELOP SECURITY POLICY
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APPENDIX M

EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT SECURITY POLICIES
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APPENDIX N
STRATEGY FOR SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY
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APPENDIX O
SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE (L SYSTEM)
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WORKFLOW OF SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE (L SYSTEM)
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APPENDIX Q
ESSENTIAL COLLECTION RESOURCES AND COLLECTION APPROACHES
(Carbone, 2004)
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Information Needed

•

Organizational mission statements and security

mission statements
•

Organizational goals and security goals

•

Organizational structures

•

Organizational size in annual revenue, expenses,

and number of employees
•

List of organizational products and services and
quantity sold

•

Number and types of organizational customers

•

Organizational business units and their

obj ectives
•

Flows of organizational processes

•

Organizational business

•

5 Ws (what, when, who, why, where) and 1 H (how):

strategic plan

o

What do organizations do?

o

When did key essential events or historical
changes, which impacted organizations' daily
operations, take place? Or when will key

essential events, which will affect on the

way organizations operate, take place?
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o

Who are organizations' key customers,

suppliers, vendors, partners, government
agencies (external interfaces) or potential
business sponsors?

o

Why do things not turn out right?

o

Where (locations) did organizations serve

and where are organizations serving?

o

How do organizations conduct business (sales
channels)?

Organizational strengths, weaknesses,

opportunities, and threats (SWOT), including
organizations' stress / risks, challenges,

environmental changes, growth/cost containment
opportunities
Organizational key constraints from regulatory,
legislative, and shareholder considerations about

how to manage organizations

Organizational major themes, motivational, or
cultural forces that impact the behavior of the
organization and business direction
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•

Organizations current IT and security technology,
such as enterprise-wide IT and security

infrastructures
Essential Collection Resources
•

The statement of organizational mission or goals

•

Strategic business plans

•

Organizational charts for business and IT

•

Documentation about major programs of key
business units and their objectives

•

Security police if in existence

•

Annual IT plan if in existence

•

IT process flowchart if in existence

•

Target function flowchart, target information

flowchart, target process requirements, and
process descriptions if in existence
•

Key reports or indices, such as the annual report,

the report of assessment about current
organizations, and measurement result reports
•

Research and trade publications

•

Supplier agreements

•

Documentation about execution, operations, tools,
and development environments
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o

This type of resource is useful when

establishing current architecture.

•

Information source reports / forms / memos, file

descriptions, data volume, data location, and
existing data architectures and conceptual data

models if in existence
o

This type of resource is useful when
establishing data architecture.

•

Application system and data flow, a report
containing security evaluation, the function
improvement opportunities, descriptions of

current applications, and the findings about

user-satisfaction ratings

o

This type of resource is useful when
establishing application architecture.

•

IT architecture, model, design, infrastructure

documentation if in existence
o

This type of resource is useful when

establishing technology architecture.
Essential Collection Approaches

•

Conducting interviews or surveys with top

business managers, key opinion leaders in the
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business, and high-ranking IT managers (Carbone,
2004)

o

CEO or CIO strongly supports this activity
and can efficiently collect sufficient

information from interviews or

questionnaires.

o

Appendix A is an example of a questionnaire

coming from Carbone (Carbone, 2004).
•

Ongoing feedback from key organizational
stakeholders

•

Developing target process flows for the current
state and the target state

o

Developing teams can simply translate

current and future processes into different
functions and information flows. The rule of
thumb is to keep these diagrams as simple as
possible because simple diagrams can give

developing teams the ability to easily
capture major problems (Carbone, 2 0 04) .
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